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Abstract—Lattice based cryptography (LBC) is one of the
most promising post-quantum cryptographic candidates. Ring-
learning with errors (R-LWE) is an encryption scheme of LBC. In
this paper, a lightweight hardware implementation is presented
including key generation, encryption, and decryption. The R-
LWE encryption scheme consists of a Gaussian sampler and
polynomial multiplication. This paper uses cumulative distri-
bution table (CDT) as the Gaussian sampler and schoolbook
approach for the polynomial multiplication. The purpose of this
architecture is to achieve small area consumption with high
frequency. The hardware implementation results on the Xilinx
Kintex-7 FPGA show that the design consumes 808 slices and
the frequency can be up to 288.35MHz.
Index Terms—lattice-based cryptography; ring-learning with
errors; cumulative distribution table; polynomial multiplication;
FPGA
I. INTRODUCTION
In the increasingly prominent context of information se-
curity, higher security encryption algorithms are required to
protect personal information and privacy. With the break-
through of quantum computer, especially the invention of
quantum algorithm represented by Shor [1] in 1994, exist-
ing public-key encryption algorithms based on large number
decomposition and discrete logarithm such as RSA [2] and
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [3] will be no longer secure.
In order to resist the attacks of quantum computer, post-
quantum cryptography (PQC) has been created, such as the
commonly cited lattice based [4], code-based [5], hash-based
[6], multivariate quadratic [7] cryptography, and the latest
supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key exchange
protocol scheme [8]. Amongst the potential PQC algorithms,
lattice-based cryptography (LBC) is one of the most promising
candidates. LBC algorithms are based a hard problem of the
short (or closest) vector problem (SVP or CVP) in a lattice.
This hard problem in LBC is believed to be difficult for
classical and quantum computers. Therefore, even the practical
quantum computer comes true, it can still be robust enough to
withstand an attack.
Ring-learning with errors (R-LWE) algorithm was proposed
by Lyubashevsky et al. [4]. It operates on the ring Zq[x]/(f),
where f is an irreducible polynomial and p is a prime. In most
cases, f = xn + 1 where n is a power of 2. R-LWE algorithm
uses polynomial multiplication, which leads to large key sizes
and signnificant hardware resources. However, compared to
RSA and ECC, it is compact.
In this paper, we aim to design a lightweight hardware
implementation of R-LWE, which uses a small amount of re-
sources but also guarantees security. For the Gaussian sampler,
the cumulative distribution table (CDT) method is used due
to its simplicity and lightweight feature. This method does
not use any RAM and has a fast speed. Before the Gaussian
sampler, we use M-sequence as the random number generator.
To implement the costly polynomial multiplication, we use
schoolbook multiplication instead of the number theoretic
transform (NTT). Rather than using the block RAM, the
proposed design is implemented with distributed RAM (i.e.,
LUTM), which can achieve high frequency and throughput.
The lightweight design includes implementations of R-LWE
for key generation, encryption, and decryption. The parameter
set used is (n, q, σ) = (256, 7681, 4.51) which is consistent
with [9] and attains the medium security levels.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
background of R-LWE public-key scheme. Section III presents
the proposed hardware architecture for both of the encryption
and decryption of the R-LWE public key scheme. Section IV
gives the hardware results and compares with previous designs.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Lattice-based cryptography has already been implemented
in a number of different situations, with schemes based on
the hardness of the learning with errors problem (LWE) and
the Ring-LWE (R-LWE) problem. Compared with LWE, R-
LWE algorithm improves the public and private key size and
improves efficiency. However, R-LWE algorithms also have
some disadvantages, such as complex operation of polynomial
multiplication. Po¨ppelmann and Gu¨neysu proposed an efficient
polynomial multiplication based on NTT [10], and later they
provided the whole design of the R-LWE scheme with some
practical optimizations [11]. In addition, they investigate a
low-cost scenario with very limited resources [12], using
different values of parameter sets and using the Bernoulli
sampler.
The R-LWE algorithm mainly consists of two operations,
that is, the Gaussian sampler and multiplication. Discrete
Gaussian distribution (devoted as Dσ) is considered over the
integers with standard deviation σ and mean µ = 0. In this
work, the Gaussian standard deviation σ = 4.51 is used. The
Gaussian probability distribution function is as follows.
f(x) =
1
(
√
2piσ)
exp
(
− (x− µ)
2
2σ2
)
= 0.88457exp(−0.2458x2)
(1)
And the cumulative probability distribution equation is
F (x) =
∫ x
∞ f(t)dt. According to the probability theory, we
can have the following results.
For X ∼ N(µ, σ2),
F (x) = P{X ≤ x} = P{(X − µ)/σ ≤ (x− µ)/σ}
= Φ((x− µ)/σ)
then,
F (1) = P{X ≤ 1} = Φ(1/σ) = 0.5871
F (2) = P{X ≤ 2} = Φ(2/σ) = 0.6700
F (3) = P{X ≤ 3} = Φ(3/σ) = 0.7486
Next, some uniform distribution (devoted as U ) random
numbers are needed to compose the discrete Gaussian dis-
tribution number. The maximum number of uniform random
numbers determine the precision of the Gaussian distribution.
Another complex operation is polynomial multiplication.
It’s the most time-consuming operation, resulting in slow
computation. The schoolbook algorithm can be written as
follows.
ab =
n−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
aibjx
i+j
mod(xn + 1) (2)
where a and b are the two inputs to the multiplier. This
calculation has a time complexity O(n2).
The public key encryption scheme of R-LWE including
Key gen(), Enc(a,p,m) and Dec(c1, c2) is defined as
shown in Table I.
TABLE I
THE PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION SCHEME OF R-LWE
Key gen() Generate r1, r2 ∈ Dσ and a ∈ U . Let p =
r1 − ar2. Then the public key is p and the
secret key is r2.
Enc(a,p,m) Generate e1, e2, e3 ∈ Dσ . Let m¯ =
ENCODE(m). Then the cipher text is c1 =
ae1 + e2, c2 = pe1 + e3 + m¯
Dec(c1, c2) The plaintext is DECODE(c = c1r2 + c2)
III. THE PROPOSED LIGHTWEIGHT HARDWARE
ARCHITECTURE OF THE R-LWE
In this section, the proposed lightweight hardware architec-
ture of R-LWE lattice-based encryption is presented. We use
a fast and low-cost Gaussian sampler based on CDT method
and a pipelined schoolbook polynomial multiplier.
A. Discrete Gaussian Sampling
For the discrete Gaussian sampler, the standard deviation
σ = 4.51 (s =
√
2piσ = 11.31) and the mean µ = 0 is
used. In this design, we use a precomputed table (3140 bits)
to sample the data. 40 random bits are generated to compare
with the table and calculate the rank of the data in which the
maximum number is 31.
The first step of the Gaussian sampler is generating the
random bits. Considering the good statistical properties of
M-sequence, we apply it to generate the required random
numbers. Then we need to find the order of the number,
comparing with those number in the precomputed data. In this
process, we can use method of binary search to increase the
speed of calculation. However, the number generated through
this method is too small and will be insecure. A better way to
solve this problem is to distribute the number to both sides of
x-axis and this covers both positive and negative sides of the
distribution as it is symmetrical. The details are described in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Discrete Gaussian Sampling Based on CDT
Input: seed : 40-bit unsigned, q = 7681 modulus,
PGD : precomputed Gaussian data
Output: gdata : 13-bit unsigned
1: rnd = m squence(seed);
2: min = 0; cur = 16; jmp = 16;
3: do
4: cur = min + jmp;
5: jmp = jmp  1;
6: if(rnd ≥ PGD(cur))
7: min = cur;
8: while(jmp == 0)
9: if( rnd[0] )
10: gdata = cur;
11: else
12: gdata = q - cur;
13: return gdata;
Fig. 1 shows the hardware structure of discrete Gaussian
sampler. The primitive polynomial of M-sequence is f(x) =
x40 + x5 + x4 + x3 + 1. The hardware circuit brings one
Gaussian data per clock. Hence a full Gaussian polynomial
can be produced after 256 clocks.
B. Polynomial Multiplication
We use schoolbook multiplication for the parameter set
n = 256 and q = 7681 [9]. It can be implemented with just
a multiplier of 13 × 13 bits. The cost is much lower than
NTT method. Algorithm 2 shows the process of a 13 × 13
bit multiplier, where addition and modular reduction are also
required. It is not easy to perform the modulo reduction. If
you use the divider to implement it, it will waste a lot of
resources. Barrett’s reduction algorithm [13] can solve this
problem, but this needs a small modification. In [14], an
algorithm was proposed to fit the AVR micro processor. The
variant of algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
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Fig. 1. Hardware structure of the discrete Gaussian sampling.
Algorithm 2 Barrett’s Reduction Variant Algorithm
Input: x : 26-bit unsigned, q = 7681 modulus
Output: y : 13-bit unsigned
1: t = x[25:13] + x[25:17] + x[25:21];
2: tq = (t13) + t - (t9);
3: y = x - tq;
4: if(y ≥ q)
5: y = y - q;
6: if(y ≥ q)
7: y = y - q;
8: if(y ≥ q
9: y = y - q;
10: return y;
In this algorithm, x is the product of two numbers and y
is number x modulo q. In Step 2, we observe that 7681 =
0x1e01 = 0x2000 − 0x0100 + 0x0001. Therefore, we can
simplify the multiplication of t × q to addition and shift
operations. Then, if the obtained result is not totally reduced,
additional subtractions are needed (steps 4-9 in Algorithm 2),
where the maximum number of subtractions is 3.
Fig. 2 shows the hardware structure of modular reduction
with multiplication. It uses two additions, five subtractions and
shift operations.
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Fig. 2. Hardware structure of the modular reduction.
C. Hardware Architectures of R-LWE
The R-LWE algorithm includes three parts, key generation,
encryption, and decryption. In the key generation part, two
Gaussian distributed polynomials r1, r2 and a uniformly dis-
tributed polynomial a are produced. Polynomial a is sampled
directly from M-sequence. Polynomial multiplication and sub-
traction is used to obtain the public key p and the private key
r2. Polynomial subtraction can be performed by addition and
using a multiplexer. When the addition operation is finished,
there is a simple modulus operation with a comparator using
a multiplexer. Fig. 3 is the hardware architecture of the key
generation process.
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Fig. 3. Hardware architecture of the key generation process.
For encryption, Gaussian noise polynomials e1, e2, e3 are
required for the ciphertext calculation. Every addition needs
another multiplexer to ensure the result is below 7681. Mes-
sage m is hidden by c2. The polynomial c1 does not contain
any information of the message and it is just an assistant during
the decryption process. Fig. 4 shows the hardware architecture
of the encryption process.
D Q
CLK
40 bits
m sequence e1
e2
e3
modulo
×
Multiplication
a
p
Flow ControlA
d
d
it
io
n
+
ae1
pe1
c2 c1
Addition
+
m
Encryption
Addition
+
PGD
Sampler
>
Fig. 4. Hardware architecture of the encryption process.
TABLE II
RESULT OF PERFORMANCE AND RESOURCE CONSUMPTION
K7 (256,7681,4.51)
Resources Key Enc Dec
LUT 934 1098 609
FF 356 407 318
Slices 289 337 182
LUTM 195 281 215
BRAM 0 0 0
DSP 1 1 1
Freq. 288.35MHz
Cycles 66057 131604 65802
Op./s 4365.17 2191.04 4382.09
TABLE III
COMPARISON WITH OTHER R-LWE IMPLEMENTATIONS (K-7: KINTEX-7,
S-6: SPARTAN-6, V-6: VIRTEX-6, S-IV: STRATIX-IV).
Designs Part LUT FF BRAM DSP Freq(MHz) Op./s
This
work
(K-7)
Key 934 356 0 1
288.35
4365
Enc 1098 407 0 1 2191
Dec 609 318 0 1 4382
[12]
(S-6)
Enc 360 290 2 1 128 934
Dec 162 136 1 1 179 2700
[11]
(V-6) Tol 4549 3624 12 1 262 14162
[15]
(S-IV)
Enc 28977 29290 234 22 235.40 107181
Dec 6761 7616 31 20 249.44 217864
Lastly, in the decryption, there is no need to generate
Gaussian values, which only need to calculate c = c1r2+c2.
Fig. 5 shows the hardware architecture of the decryption
process.
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Fig. 5. Hardware architecture of the decryption process.
IV. RESULTS AND COMPARISON
We have implemented the proposed R-LWE encryption
scheme on Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA (using Vivado 2016.4)
with parameter sets (256,7681,4.51). Table II presents the
performance and hardware cost. The design includes three
parts, which do not share any hardware, due to that the
key management, encryption and decryption core may not be
contained in the same device. Pipelining has been applied to
increase the frequency of design with registers. In addition, we
use LUT RAM (LUTM) instead of block memory, which can
save the memory resources and achieve higher frequency, but
costs extra LUT resources. Table III presents the comparison
with other R-LWE encryption implemented in hardware.
[12] uses the different parameter sets (256,4093,3.33) and
its frequency is not high but it is low-cost. [11] uses the NTT
algorithm as polynomial multiplication and reuse the same
multiplication module. [15] is a high throughput design and
high security with n = 512, which targets high speed. But it
costs much more DSP blocks and RAM resource. Comparing
with these R-LWE designs, the proposed design does not
use any RAM and has the highest frequency with rather low
hardware cost.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, a lightweight R-LWE hardware implemen-
tation is presented. The proposed design uses CDT as the
Gaussian sampler and a schoolbook multiplier for polynomial
multiplication. The design achieves the highest frequency with
rather low hardware cost, compared with previous works.
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